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BASIS FOR DEPRECIATION IN INCOME TAXES
By W LEwis ROBERTS*
Increases in income tax rates m recent years have led tax-
payers to more carefully consider allowable deductions to reduce
their net incomes as much as possible. Depreciation allowances
on property that wears out or becomes worthless m the course of
time have not been overlooked as a means of accomplishing this
end. As a result the subject of depreciation has given rise to
much litigation in recent years. During the past two or three
years several interesting decisions m this field have been handed
down by the courts, especially in determimng the basis or value
of the property on which depreciation is allowed. It is the pur-
pose of thls article to examine these recent decisions and see
what a taxpayer may expect from an examination of his deduc-
tions for depreciation if the commissioner disagrees with him and
it is necessary to settle the matter in court.
Section 23 (e) of the Internal Revenue Code defines depre-
ciation as "a reasonable allowance for the exhaustion, wear and
tear (1) on property used m the trade or business, or (2)
property held for the production of income." It may be of in-
terest to see what the courts have considered in the past as "used
in the trade or business" of the taxpayer or what property has
been considered as "held for the production of income."
The phrases property "used in trade or business" and prop-
erty held for the "production of income" seem so unambiguous
that we might reasonably expect that their meaning would not
come before the courts in litigation. Let us look at some of the
problems that have been presented to the courts in recent years
involving the meamng. of these two phrases.
It has, of course, been made clear that depreciation cannot be
deducted for ordinary wear and tear of property not used in a
trade or business.1 A taxpayer is not entitled to a deduction on
the depreciation of his automobile which he uses in going to
* Professor of Law, Emeritus, Umversity of Kentucky- A.B., Brown Umver-
sity; A.M., Pennsylvama State College; J.D., Umversity of Chicago, S.J.D., Har-
vard Umversity.
1Matheson v. Commissioner, 54 F 2d 537 (2d C., 1932).
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and from his place of business. That is a personal use.2 Steel
tugs and wooden barges, which were not in actual use for long
periods but were kept ready and in seaworthy condition, were
subject to depreciation deductions. 3  Realty, managed and im-
proved by testamentary trustees, was subject to an allowance
as used in a trade or business.4 A mailing list of persons likely
to contribute to charities was not subject to depreciation where
the taxpayer was engaged in the business of soliciting funds
for charities.5 Patents in the hands of an inventor are depreciable
property as they are used in his business." A winery leased until
1922 and thereafter idle as the owner could neither lease nor
operate it himself was not demed allowance for depreciation.7
A life insurance company is entitled to depreciation upon the
furniture used in its investment department, but not upon that
used in its underwriting department.' A life tenant, who owned
also a one-fourth interest in the fee of property used in the busi-
ness of selling realty, was allowed deduction on his interest in
the fee. A farmer may take a depreciation deduction on hIs farm
buildings, other than his dwelling house; on his farm machinery
and on his livestock bought for work, breeding or dairy pur-
poses. 1 In Frederzck Victor and Achelis v Salt's Textile Manu-
facturing Co.1" a deduction was allowed for depreciation of the
franc.
Still more vaned is the list of situations where depreciation
deductions have been disallowed. An instance is that of a Ger-
man language newspaper that was deied a deduction on loss
of anticipated renewals and subscriptions. 2 A deduction for
depreciation on patterns and dies where the taxpayer had charged
the patterns and dies in his expense account was denied.' 3 No
Coburn v. Commissioner, 138 F 2d 763 (2d C., 1943); Clark v. Couder,
158 F 2d 851 (6th C., 1946).
'Dougherty & Co. v. Comr., 159 F 2d 269 (4th C., 1946).
'Rogers v. United States, 69 F Supp. 8 (D. Conn., 1946).
&Pohlen et al v. Corn r., 165 F 2d 258 (5th C., 1948).
'Harvey v. Cor r., 171 F 2d 952 (9th C., 1949).
7 Kitterage v. Corn r., 88 F 2d 632 (2d C., 1937).
8Helvenng v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 71 F 2d 292 (2d C., 1934).
'Huber v. United States, 16 F Supp. 773 (Ct. Claims, 1936).
"Belknap et al. v. United States, 55 F Supp. 90 (W D., Ky., 1944).
"26 F 2d 249 (D., Conn., 1928).
National Weeklies, Inc. v. Reynolds, Collector, 43 F Supp. 554, (D.,
Minn., 1942).
'Kemer-Villiams Stamping Co. v. United States, F Supp. 807 (Ct. Claims,
1940).
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deduction was allowed on a long term lease renewable in per-
petuity 14 Where a playwright gave an exclusive use of a copy-
righted play to a picture producer the copyright was held to be
not "property used in trade or business."" A particular automo-
bile model that had met with public favor was not subject to
depreciation." Where the taxpayer acquired a plant in consoli-
dation and did not use it, no deduction for depreciation was
allowed.'7 In one case no deduction was allowed by the collector
where the taxpayer bought a ferry and later learned that a bridge
was going to be built which would take his patronage away
from lm.s Several cases arose upon the adoption of Prohibi-
ton. The courts held no deduction in such case should be
allowed for obsolescence of good will.' "  The United States
Supreme Court was quoted as ruling that " when a business
is extinguished as noxious under the Constitution the owners
cannot demand compensation from the Government or a partial
compensation in the form of an abatement in taxes otherwise
due. 20
In a later case the same court did allow a brewing company
a deduction for obsolescence of buildings due to Prohibition. -'
Prior to this decision a circuit court had refused any allowance
for loss of good will of a malting companv22-and the Supreme
Court denied a wit of certiorari. - To the same effect was the
case of J Che G. Hupfeel Co. v Anderson.2 4 Prior to an amend-
ment of the revenue law in 1942 an individual owner of vessels
which were not used in a trade or business was not allowed to
take a deduction on them in computing his income tax, but after
that date deductions for depreciation were allowed on property
held in such a case for producing income.25  Finally, where the
United States Industrial Alcohol Company acquired, among as-
"New York Central R. Co. v. Corn r., 79 F 2d 247 (2d C., 1935).
"Goldsmith v. Comr., 143 F 2d 466 (2d C., 1944).
Dodge Bros., Inc. v. United States, 33 F Supp. 312 (D., Md., 1940).
"eal Estate Land Title and Trust Co. v. United States, 809 U. S. 18 (1940).
"Detroit and Windsor Ferry Co. v. Woodward, 115 F 2d 795 (6th C., 1940).
"Rockwood v. United States, 88 F 2d 707 (Ct. Claims, 1930); Seneca
Hotel Co. v. United States, 42 F 2d 343 (Ct. Claims, 1930).
- Nugles v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 8 S. Ct. 273, 31 L. Ed. 205 (1887).
'Loewers Gambrrnus Brewing Co. v. Anderson, 282 U. S. 638 (1931).
---Red Wing Malting Co. v. Wilcuts, 15 F 2d 626 (8th C., 1926).
278 U. S. 763 (1927).
2'51 F "2d 115 (S. D., N. Y., 1931).
"Wilson Bros. Co. v. Corn r., 170 F 2d 423 (9th C., 1948).
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sets of a company it had taken over, contracts calling for delivenes
before the end of the year, it was not allowed depreciation de-
ductions on these contracts. 2
Of course, the person entitled to take a depreciation deduction
on a piece of property is he who naturally bears the loss from wear
and tear or obsolescence. That usually means the owner takes the
deduction, but it is not always as simple as that. There are
situations where the owner of property may not be entitled to a
deduction of "a reasonable allowance for the exhaustion, wear
and tear of property used in the trade or business, including a
reasonable allowance for obsolescence." An instance in point is
that of a lessor. In the case of Grant Building, Inc. v Commis-
stoner of Internal Revenue,27 a landowner leased land on which
a building was erected by the lessee. The lessor made a contri-
bution for the erection of the building. It was to receive an
annual rental of six per cent of the cost. This did not give it an
investment status in the building and it was not allowed to take
a depreciation deduction on the same. The right of the lessor
to take a depreciation deduction on the leased property depends
upon the terms of the lease. Cases hold that a lessee's agreement
to keep up repairs does not prevent the lessor from taking a de-
duction because of obsolescence.
A different holding has been reached where the lessee agrees
to return the leased premises at the end of the lease in as good
condition as when received, or where the lease is for a long
period of time, 999 years or even 99 years with right to renewal
forever. In such cases the burden of loss from wear and tear is
placed on the lessee and it is only ]ust that he should be the one
entitled to take the deduction. 9
As between a life tenant and a remainderman, the latter is
generally the one who bears the loss and should be given the
I" United States Industrial Alcohol Co. v. Helverng, 137 F 2d 511 (2d C.,
1943).
a169 F 2d 469 (3d C., 1948).
Alaska Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 141 F 2d 675 (8th C., 1944); St. Paul
Union Depot Co. v. Commissioner, 123 F 2d 235 (8th C., 1941); and Helvering
v. Terminal Railroad Assoc., 89 F 2d 739 (8th C., 1937).
"'Wiener v. Weiss, 27 F 2d 200 (6th C., 1929), appealed 279 U. S. 333
(1929), not questioned on the point; Frank & S. Co. v. Commissioner, 44 F 2d
147 (3d C., 1930); Cogar v. Commissioner, 44 F 2d( 554 (6th C., 1930); re-
argument demed in 51 F 2d 501 (6th C., 1931); and Bonwit Teller & Company
v. Commissioner, 53 F 2d 381 (2d C., 1931).
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deduction for depreciation." Where a trust instrument makes
no provision as to who shall take the allowable deduction on the
trust property, it is provided in the Code that it shall be appor-
tioned among the beneficiaries according to their respective
interests." This specific provision for depreciation deductions
in the case of trusts first appeared in the Revenue Act of 1928.
In the Lazarus case, 32 the taxpayer conveyed realty in trust
to his bank and took a lease from the bank. The question arose
as to whether he or the bank was entitled to take the deduction
for depreciation. The Court of Appeals decided that he was,
since the transaction was reallv a mortgage to secure a loan. In
the Scott case, 33 the taxpayer had a one-eighth interest in the
distributed income under a trust. One-half the income went to
charities and since charitable organizations were not taxable and
therefore were not in a position to take advantage of any depre-
ciation deduction, the taxpayer contended that the noncharitable
beneficiaries were entitled to the whole deduction and that his
share was one-fourth of the depreciation on the trust property
The Court of Claims disagreed with him and held he was entitled
to only one-eighth. It is different when a trust suffers a deduct-
ible loss as in the Grey case. 4  It was there held that the trust
alone and not the beneficiaries were entitled to take the loss in
computing income taxes. The beneficiaries were entitled to the
net income of the trust as provided in the statute, and not the
"taxable trust income." As the Court pointed out, "Under the
revenue acts, a trust is regarded as a taxable party separate and
distinct from its beneficiaries.",
Having considered thus far what property is "used in trade
or business" or held for the "production of income," and also
who is allowed to take the deduction in computing his income
tax, let us turn to the real problem under consideration and see
Laflin v. Commissioner, 69 F 2d 460 (7th C., 1934).
I. R. C. Section 28 (b) (2). "In the case of property held in trust the
allowable deduction shall be apportioned between the income beneficiaries and
the trustee m accordance with the pertinent provisions of the instrument creating
the trust, or, in the absence of such provisions, on the basis of the trust income,
allocable to each."
I Commissioner v. F & R. Lazarus & Co., 101 F 2d 728 (6th C., 1939),
cert. granted 308 U. S. 437
'Scott v. United States, 78 F Supp. 811 (Ct. Cl., 1948).
"Charles F Grey v. Commissioner 118 F 2d 153 (7th C., 1941).
'Id. at p. 154
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how the courts in the recent cases have settled the question of
what value is to be given the property on which depreciation is
allowed. In other words, what is the basis to be taken for
depreciation purposes?
The United States Supreme Court laid down the proposition
that the "adjusted basis," as shown by several sections of the
Internal Revenue Code, "shall be the cost of the property "3 Mr.
justice Jackson, speaking for the Court, said.
"For the basis we are referred by Section 23 (n)
to Section 114 of the Act which refers us again to Section
113 (b) thereof which provides an adjiusted basis for gain
or loss but which again refers us to Section 113 (a) for
the basis upon which adjustment is to be made. The sum
of these is that the basis of depreciation allowance shall
be the cost of such property "37
The question the Court'had under consideration at the time
was whether an electric power company could take a deprecia-
tion deduction on line extensions paid for by persons desiring
to secure the services of the company These extensions became
the property of the company, which refunded in cases where the
revenue was sufficient to warrant its so doing. The court con-
cluded that Section 113 (a) means cost to the owner and that
the payments by the customers were neither gifts nor contribu-
tions to the company and affirmed the holding of the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, to the effect that the utility company
was not entitled to deductions for depreciation on the line exten-
sions. Whether the court was right in its holding in this case,
in view of very recent cases, will be considered later. In the
Oxford Paper Co. case,3" it was said "cost" as used in Section
113 (b) normally means cost to the taxpayer. In the case of a
taxpayers assuming liabilities in consideration of the property
" Detroit Edison Co. v. Corn r., 319 U. S. 98, 87 L. Ed. 1286, 63 S. Ct.
902 (1943).
"' Id., p. 101. Section 114 (a) "Basis for Depreciation.-The basis upon
which exhaustion, wear and tear, and obsolescence are to be allowed in respect
of any property shall be the adjusted basis provided in section 113 (b) for the
purpose of determining the gain upon the sale or other disposition of such
property."
Section 113 (a) "Basis (Unadjusted) of Property.-The basis of property
shall be the cost of such property, except that " (The exceptions then con-
sidered are inventory value, gifts, property transmitted at death, tax-free ex-
changes, and certain corporate transactions.)
86 F Supp. 366 (S. D., N. Y., 1949).
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received, the basis for depreciation of the property is the amount
of the liabilities assumed. "9 The fair market value of stock given
for patent rights has been held to be the basis for depreciation
of the patents for income tax purpose.40  Mr. Justice Roberts, in
speaking for the court in Helvertng v Owens,"' regarded Section
118 (b) (1) (B) as limiting the amount on which depreciation
may be taken as not to exceed the cost. The various courts of
appeal have also emphasized the fact that the total cost to the
taxpayer is the basis for depreciation purposes as well as for
computing loss and gain for income tax purposes.42
Not infrequently cases arise where the taxpayer has purchased
property at bankrupt sales and the question arises as to what
shall be his basis in computing his income tax returns. Ordi-
narily it will be the cost of the assets to the taxpayer.43 Where
the taxpayer, who was mortagee, bid in the property at the
mortgage sale, the actual market value of the property at the
time of the sale was taken as the basis and not the amount of
the bid.44 Where the bondholder s committee organized a new
corporation to take over the assets of the bankrupt corporation
and exchanged stock in the new corporation for the bonds of
the old company, there was a tax-free reorganization and the
new corporation was entitled to take the cost of the property
to the old as a basis for computing depreciation. And in Brzggs-
Darby Construction Co. v Commissioner,4 the Fifth Circuit
allowed a corporation, organized by the parent corporation to
take over equipment on construction jobs, to take the price paid
for equipment as the new cost basis and were not limited to the
depreciation cost basis of the parent company
Numerous cases involving the basis to be taken for comput-
"At p. 368.A4 0 Hazeltine Corporation v. Com r, 89 F 2d 513 (3d C., 1937).
" 805 U. S. 468 (1938).
42 Clinton Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Corn r, 78 F 2d 292 (4th C., 1935); Herder
et al v. Helvenng, 106 F 2d (Dist. Col., 1939); Bonn Corporation v. Com rs, 117
F 2d 917 (6th C., 1911); Arndel-Brooks Concrete Corporation v. Comr, 129
F 2d 762 (4th C., 1942); and A. L. Carter Co. et al v. Cornr, 143 F 2d 296
(5th C., 1944).
"Cornr v. Schumacker Wall Board Corporation, 93 F 2d 79 (9th C., 1937);
Chushman Motor Works v. Cor r, 130 F 2d 977 (8th C., 1942), cert. derned 318
U. S. 756; and Hoboken Land & Improvement Co. v. Com r, 138 F 2d 104
(3rd C., 1943).
"Helverng v. New President Corporation, 122 F 2d 92 (8th C., 1941).
"Pelham Hall Co. v. Hassett, Collector, 149 F 2d 63 (1st C., 1945)." 119 F 2d 89 (5th C., 1941).
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Ing income taxes arise where there has been a tax free reorganiza-
tion of a corporation under Sections 112 (b) and 112 (g) The
usual result has been that the new corporation is allowed the
basis of the old corporation since the property is still in the hands
of those who controlled before the transfer was made.4
7
Controversies have often arisen between the tax commissioner
and persons who have acquired the property in question by devise
or inheritance. Where an executor was paying the tax, the value
of the estate at the decedent's death was taken and not the cost
to the decedent in Hartley v Commissioner 4S If the devisee
receives the property subject to a mortgage, his basis is the value
of the buildings and not the value of his equity in the same.49
A question that recent cases in the Tax Court and Circuit Courts
leave in an unsettled condition is whether the devisee or heir
is entitled to depreciation on buildings erected by lessees on land
held under long-term leases. Two circuit courts have demed the
right00 and the Tax Court has allowed it."-
In the case of gift of real property, it has been ruled that the
donee should use the fair market value of the property on the
date of conversion where he has converted rental property into
income-bearing property 02 Also, where a parent corporation
took over depreciated assets in liqtudatmg a subsidiary, the basis
was the fair market value of the assets on the date they were
taken in exchange for stock and not the cost of the assets to the
subsidiary; 3 and in fixing the value of paper mill property for
tax depreciation purposes the fair market value of the stock issued
in payment was taken. 4
" Fairbanks Court Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Cor r, 84 F 2d 18 (7th C.,
1936); Rex Mfg. Co. Inc. v. Cor r, 102 F 2d 325 (7th C., 1939); Republic
Steel Corporation v. United States, 40 F Supp. 1017 (Ct. Claims, 1941); Helver-
ing v. New Haven & St. L. R. Co., Inc., 121 F 2d 985 (2d C., 1941), cert. demed
315 U. *S. 803; Muskegon Motor Specialties Co. v. Com r, 134 F 2d 904 (6th C.,
194:3); Praire du Cluen-Marquette Bridge Co. v. Corn r, 142 Fed. 624 (3d C.,
1944); and Republic Steel Corporation v. United States, 86 F Supp. 146 (Ct.
Claims, 1949).
" 72 F 2d 352 (8th C., 1934), affirmed 295 U. S. 216, modified 295 U. S. 719.
" Comr v. Crane, 153 F 2d 504 (2d C., 1945), affirmed 331 U. S. 1.
" Com r v. Pearson, 51-1 U. S. T. C. § 9236 (5th C., 4/11/51), First National
Bank of Kansas City, Trustee, v. Nee, 51-1 U. S. T. C. § 9342 (8th C., 6/7/51).
Moore v. Comr, 15 T. C. 906 (1950).
'Perkins v. Comr, 125 F 2d 150 (6th C., 1942).
'Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 47 F Supp. 259 (Ct. Claims, 1942).
" Fox River Paper Corporation v. United States, 65 F Supp. 605 (E. D..
Wis., 1946).
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In adjusting depreciation allowances the courts are sometimes
called upon to determine the length of time over which deduc-
tions are to be permitted. Since the object of allowing such
deductions is to return to the taxpayer the amount of his invest-
ment in property that wears out or becomes obsolescent in the
course of time, it becomes necessary to determine upon the
period such property can be of use in the taxpayer s business.
The Bureau has worked out the approximate lives and deprecia-
tion rates of such property to aid the taxpayer in making out his
tax returns, 5 but tins table does not meet all possible situations.
The court has said that the question of the useful economic life
of a thirty-three-story office building, for instance, is one of fact
to be determined from the evidence in the case." Where a
hydroelectric plant had a useful life of 100 years and the life
of the structure s improvements was of 60 years and the com-
pany s license from the Federal Power Commission ran for only
50 years, the company was required to make its depreciation de-
ductons on the basis of 100 and 60 years respectively and not
for the 50-year period of'its license.57 In Bank of American Na-
tional Trust & Savings Association v United States,8 the tax-
payer was required to use the depreciation base as reduced by
the amount allowable each year, whether a deduction was claimed
or not. It will not allow the taxpayer to accumulate deductions
for use in a year when the company s net returns are large. Where
the taxpayer has made deductions in excess of the amount allow-
able in prior years, it will not prevent reducing the depreciation
base in subsequent years by the lesser amount that was allow-
able. The policy of increasing the depreciation rate where the
use of machinery is increased was denied a taxpayer in a recent
case on a showing that repair bills were higher and offset the
greater use being made of the machinery because of wartime
conditions. In other words, the frequent repairs might offset
the heavy usage."9
The United States Supreme Court made it clear in the case of
'Bulletin "F" 511 CCH, par. 219.29.
'First Nat. Building Corporation v. Jones, 36 F Supp. 682 (W D., Okla.,
1941), appeal demed, 129 F 2d 1019 (10th C .......... ).
" Union Electric Co. v. Com r, 177 F 2d 269 (8th C., 1949).
' 69 F Supp. 932 (N. D., Cal., 1949), affirmed 168 F 2d 899 (9th C.).
' Copifyer Lithograph, 12 T. C. 728 (1949).
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Virgima Hotel Corporation v Helverng0 that the base reduction
under section 113 (b) (1) (B) of the Internal Revenue Code"
included allowable deduction whether the taxpayer took the
deduction or whether he was benefitted by an allowable deduction
or not. In that case the taxpayer had taken deductions yearly
on a straight line basis for several years. Then for three years
it earned no taxable income. In readjusting the depreciation
base, depreciation for these three years was taken into consid-
eration although the taxpayer had received no benefit therefrom.
The same year the District Court followed the Supreme Court's
decision in Goss & Deeuw Mach. Co. v United States.62 Since
that time, the ruling has been followed.
63
Of course, where the amount of the total deductions for de-
preciation on a piece of property equals the cost or basis used,
the taxpayer has a return of his capital investment and is entitled
to no further deductions for depreciation on the property 64 Sec-
tion 29.23 (1)-5 of Regulation 111 expressly so states.6 5
With the principles derived from the decisions so far covered
in mmd, let us next turn to the way the courts have handled the
problems arising where the taxpayer has acquired the property
on which it seeks to take a depreciation deduction as an mduce-
ment for locating one of its factories in a community or for
extending its services therem.
In the Detroit Edison case66 the taxpayer was not allowed to
take depreciation on extension of its rural lines paid for by the
persons who wanted the service. They took the view that these
payments were neither gifts nor contributions to the company s
capital and that it was not entitled to take any depreciation de-
- 319 U. S. 523, 63 S. Ct. 1260, 87 L. Ed. 1561, 30 AFTR 1304 (1943).
"Which read, to the extent allowed (but not less than the amount
allowable)
'53 F Supp. 853 (D. Conn., 1943).
Corn r v. Cleveland Adolph Mayer Realty Corporation, 160 F 2d- 1012
(6th C., 1947), Blackhawk-Perry Corp. v. Comr, 82 F 2d 319 (8th C., 1950).
"Burlington Gazette Co. v. Cor r, 75 F 2d 577 (8th C., 1935). Corn r v.
Saltsonstall, 124 F 2d 110 (1st C., 1941).
f Reg. 111, Sec. 29.23 (1)-5 reads rn part as follows: "If the cost of other
basis of the property has been recovered through depreciation or other allowances
no further deduction for depreciation shall be allowed. The deduction for de-
preciation in respect of any depreciable property for any taxable year shall be
imited to such ratable amount as may reasonably be considered necessary to




ductions, on such contributions, from its gross income in comput-
ing its income taxes.
The Fourth Circuit had the year before reached an opposite
result in Arundel-Brooks Concrete Corporation v Commissioner
,7
where part of the money for an asset was donted to the corpora-
tion by an interested party After the Supreme Court's decision
in the Detroit Edison case, the same parties and ihe same question
came before it and it held it was bound by the decision m the
Detroit Edison case.6" The Concrete Corporation was not al-
lowed depreciation on the half of the cost of its plant that had
been contributed by the Maryland Slag Co. to induce the Con-
crete Corporation to build where it did.
The Revere Land Co. case 9 presented a much more compli-
cated situation. Three corporations were involved. The Revere
Company was owner of lots on which it was proposed to erect
a large office building. The Strasswill Company was the financing
and promoting agency in securing the construction of the build-
ings, and the Grant Company was to be the owner of the build-
mg. To help finance the construction, the Revere Company
contributed over a million dollars to the Grant Company and
received an equivalent in preferred stock. Several years after
the building was completed the Revere Company claimed the
right to take a tax depreciation on the proportionate part of the
structure represented by the amount of its contribution. The
Grant Company intervened, claiming the entire depreciation
allowance on the building. The Tax Court held the Revere Com-
pany was entitled to the deduction and that the Grant Com-
pany was not.70 In reversing this holding, Judge Kolodner, in
speaking for the Third Circuit Court, said:
"Grant had an investment or ownership interest
under the statute with respect to the entire cost of con-
struction of the Grant building including Reveres contri-
bution. Grant paid' for the money of which Revere
was the originating source with the issuance of preferred
stock of Strasswill m an equal amount, just as it paid for
- 129 F 2d 762 (4th C., 1942).
"Corn r v. Anmdel-Brooks Concrete Corporation, 152 F 2d 225 (4th C.,
1945).
9Com'r v. Revere Land Co., 169 F 2d 469 (3rd C., 1948), cert. demed
335 U. S. 853.
7 T. C. 1061 (1946).
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the other funds used in the construction of the building
by the issuance of additional preferred stock and mortgage
leasehold bonds. Grant further paid' Revere for the money
in question by contracting to pay a rental of 6% annually
under the terms of the August 16, 1927, lease."
71
The same court the next year reached a similar result in
Comm.sszoner v McKay Products Corporation,72 where the com-
pany was given a building in consideration of moving its industry
to a town. It was allowed deduction for depreciation based on
the cost to the transferor. Judge Goodrich said: "We think that
the transfer entitles the taxpayer to its donors basis under Section
113 (a) (2) " He noted that they differed from the Fourth and
Eighth Circuits on this problem. The Eighth Circuit held the
same year that where a chamber of commerce had erected a build-
ing for the taxpayer for use as a factory, the latter was not en-
titled to a depreciation allowance on the building in making out
its income tax return. 3 The same court, the same year when it
passed upon the Brown Shoe case, consistently held that "cost
of property" under 26 U S. C. A., Section 114, "means cost to
the taxpayer and does not include contributions from others made
for business or community interests."7  The court m so holding
had reversed the Tax Court's decision that the taxpayer could
take the deduction. 7' The amount involved was large. Com-
munity contribution in several different states aggregated nearly
a million dollars; and the Supreme Court granted a writ of
certiorari. The Supreme Court was willing to accept Judge
Goodrich's view as expressed in Commissioner v McKey Products
Corporation,76 to the effect that the assets received and used by
the taxpayer in its business wear out and must ultimately be re-
placed and they come withm the provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code. The taxpayer was held entitled to deductions
for depreciation under Section 118 (a) (8) (B) and to include
the contributions in equity-mvested capital under Section 718
(a) (1) and (2) as well.77 Mr. Justice Clark in giving the
71At p. 482.
-178 F 2d 639 (3d C., 1948).
7"C. L. Dowung Co. v. Cor r, 172 F 2d 810 (8th C., 1949).
7 Brown Shoe Co., Inc. v. Com r, 175 F 2d 305 (8th C., 1949).
¢10 T. C. 291 (1948).
Supra, n. 72.
"3:39 U. S. 583, 70 S. Ct. 820 (1949).
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opinion of the Court sought to distinguish the decision in the
Detroit Edison Co. case" on the ground that the farmers and
other customers had no intention of making contributions to the
power company This seems, however, unsatisfactory since if
not donations, the payments must have been for anticipated
services to be rendered by the company and therefore the ex-
tension lines became property of the company and subject to
wear out with use just as any other assets of the company and
should be included m the company s depreciation allowance. If
the same facts were to come before the court again, it seems, to
be consistent, it would have to decide the other way, that the
power company would be allowed to include,such rural extension
lines in its depreciation account.
The Brown Shoe Co. case has settled an important problem
and put an end to the different solutions reached in the circuit
courts. The conclusion reached by the Supreme Court is logical
and seems consistent with the majority of the decisions we have
considered.
Supra, n. 36.
